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Summary
While the Complex Information Technology-Intensive (CITI) ﬁ rms of the ‘new 
economy’ have contributed to expanding the context and creation of social value in unprec-
edented ways they still may have a dark side: A substantial portion of this new benevolent 
image and laudable reputation rests on a very speciﬁ c framework of self interest and self 
serving preservation and perpetuation with three central tenets: regulatory capture, regula-
tory arbitrage, and regulatory opportunism. In this paper the attempt is made to expose 
and reconcile this conﬂ icted character of CITI ﬁ rms, as their seeming imperative of social 
value creation is being achieved with controversial quasi-regulatory practices. 
Key words: CITI Firms, Regulatory Opportunism, Regulatory Arbitrage.
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e Chinese proverb “May you live in interesting times!” sounds like a good-
luck wish. Yet, it is really a curse. And interesting times we live in, n’est-ce pas? Adding 
insult to injury, our entire traditional socio-economic industrial and ﬁ nancial complex 
is being unhinged in unprecedented ways, at a time when we still haven’t quite under-
stood many of the recent information technology phenomena to robustly anchor a 
knowledge-centric and information technology-intensive post-service age ‘experience 
economy’. 
1 An earlier draft  of this paper was presented at the ECIW 2009 conference in Lisbon, Portugal
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In particular, the near-cataclysmic economic collapse of the 2007 - 2009 period 
has been preceded by the emergence of a new breed of ﬁ rms already scornful of estab-
lished patterns of business and – at the time of writing - proving rather resistive to the 
turbulent gyrations of the markets. We are alluding to the likes of Google, eBay, Face-
book, Amazon – to name but the most popular - and some foreign equivalents such 
as the Chinese QQ and Baidu. We will label them Complex Information-Technology 
Intensive (CITI) ﬁ rms for their unparalleled new character. Partly as a result of eco-
nomic specialization, partly because of intelligent design, they conﬁ gure the variables 
of strategy, structure, scale, scope, and social position in a truly Schumpeterian spirit of 
creative destruction. Th ey are fractional, partial, and modular (Brusoni 2005). Th ey are 
grounded in social networks. And they are ubiquitous and quickly becoming part of 
our daily routines and economic transactions, much like utilities. Th ey are unique not 
only in the way they propose value, but in the way they exist as near-monopolies. Th ey 
increasingly shape our social fabric, guiding our communications, directing our social 
interactions, and organizing our cyberspace. While their impact is truly welcomed in 
the immediate, it comes at future costs and with as-of-yet unanticipated consequences. 
It reduces our potential for independent future decision-making and increases our so-
cio-economic path dependency in ways that we cannot yet measure. And what cannot 
be measured, can’t be understood either. What is not understood can’t be managed.
Aside sporadic and purely anecdotal evidence (such a as the alleged conspiracy 
by Google plotting world domination), the unobservable nature of the object of in-
vestigation, the new CITI ﬁ rms’ positioning vis-à-vis our socio-economic regulatory 
institutions, requires an a priori theoretical treatment. Th e purpose of this critical con-
cept paper is to expose the ontology, i.e. the world-view of these new business mod-
els with respect to our existing socio-economic institutions of government, society, 
and markets. Th e motivation is to identify and the goal is to frame the central tenets 
upon which rests the positioning of these ﬁ rms vis-à-vis their regulation and their 
regulator(s). 
Th e prominent CITI ﬁ rms mentioned above – and increasingly their foreign 
equivalents, such as the Chinese QQ and Baidu, for example - have upped the ante in 
a contradictory manner: In a noble way, on the one hand, beneﬁ ting a wide variety of 
stakeholders via some original and novel business models, they have been creating 
presumably signiﬁ cant amounts of social value, far above and beyond the immediate 
private wealth they return to their stockholders. Th eir strategies are ostensibly coop-
erative and collaborative rather than combative, their structures accentuate resilience 
and nimbleness instead of monolithic hierarchies, their immediate focus is not on 
sheer scale but on intelligent scope, and their social position sets new benchmarks in 
terms of complex transformational eﬀ ectiveness and leadership impact, i.e. deempha-
sizing simple transactional and productive eﬃ  ciency. But there is a dark side to all this 
graciousness: Some substantial portion of this new benevolent image and laudable 
reputation rests on a very speciﬁ c framework of self interest and self preservation with 
three central tenets: regulatory capture, regulatory arbitrage, and regulatory opportun-
ism. Carefully connecting the three stand-alone economic principles of monopolistic 
competition, intellectual property rights protection, and voluntary preemptive regula-
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tory forbearance, they have created power structures of unprecedented magnitude. 
While some great critics and commentators of the legal community have been voicing 
concerns loudly with respect to the legal and regulatory implications for the formation 
of a code of the business mode (i.e. the way they behave), we will present the elements 
of a framework that grounds this new controversial attitude in the business model (i.e. 
the way they exist). Our motivation in this critical concept paper is to expose the so 
called dark side of these new business models, so intensely concerned with securing 
and maintaining a monopoly position, intellectual property, and proprietary standards, 
that they indeed rival forms of command economies and statism in terms of control 
and power. Th ese new business models are creating entities that can instantaneously 
morph from market to ﬁ rm and back, elevating themselves into a sui generis form above 
and between the two pillars of our economic institutions, thus potentially evading en-
tirely their long established consequences. While we initially contended ourselves with 
benign labels such as ‘virtualized’ or ‘networked’ organizations, we increasingly have to 
worry about our discomfort with this concentrated elite of ﬁ rms in the service of a few, 
reshaping our economic environment and imposing unto us their discipline and rules. 
Th us we raise the question as to what extent this poses new risks and threats to our 
socio-economic institutions in terms of their stability, authority, and legitimacy. 
2. THE BRIGHT SIDE 
For the ﬁ rst time, ﬁ rms can do what they couldn’t do before. Until this current 
information revolution, ﬁ rms were either part of the problem, or part of the solution, 
or part of the landscape. It is now that they can either (a) be the entire landscape (e.g. 
Amazon, Google, eBay as market makers), or (b) move the landscape altogether (e.g. 
Apple and the ‘iCulture’ for music and entertainment consumption). Rather than limit-
ing themselves to the old paradigm of managerial satisﬁ cing “resolving” the problems 
(Ackoﬀ  1999) given the new conditions of constrained capital, resources, time, and 
utility resulting in an impossibility to actually “solve” the problem, CITI ﬁ rms can in-
deed “dissolve” the problem. By freely morphing from simple ﬁ rm to an entire market 
structure, for example as it is the case with Amazon’s aﬃ  liate program, they can absorb 
any original logistics problem; on the other hand, moving the very standards and foun-
dations of an industry, such as in the case of Google’s publishing initiatives, they can 
redeﬁ ne a problematic situation into a new paradigmatic one. 
Indeed, Amazon, Google, and eBay did not content themselves to being yet an-
other player in their respective industries; they became the entire market respectively, 
inviting everyone else to join and participate. Apple single-handedly changed the way 
music will be enjoyed in the future, i.e. on the move, during downtime, 24/7.
Th us the likes of Google, Amazon, and eBay undoubtedly make our lives richer 
in many respects. Th ese ﬁ rms propose tremendous social value, dwarﬁ ng at ﬁ rst sight 
the private proﬁ ts they co-generate on behalf of their owners. Th ey further implicate 
the various parties in the transaction to co-create goods, services, and experiences of 
cultural and not merely commercial quality, such as in the case of “transmutability” 
(Hughes, Lang 2006; Arakji, Lang 2007). Th ey enable us to maintain rich networks 
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of relationships far above and beyond what was previously possible. Th ey allow con-
sumers to “produce” themselves through constructs such as transmutability. Th ey have 
tremendously lowered the barriers to C2C exchange transactions and the building of 
communities. Th ey allow for consumption of goods, services, and experiences ﬁ nanced 
through non-traditional means by capitalizing and monetizing personal information. 
While it may seem almost like “free lunch”, it is so because the true cost of this new 
experience economy is not quantiﬁ ed in currency species. Th is suspected cost is not 
measured in order of magnitude or as a diﬀ erence in degree. It is diﬀ erent in nature, 
presumably logically commensurate with the new nature of those ﬁ rms.
3. THE DARK SIDE
However, there are three new contextual variables that have lead to a set of con-
tradictions in the network economy similar to the anomalies brought about by market 
imperfections.
First, digital markets for digital goods have created a situation where competi-
tion seems no longer a viable model. In the zero-variable-cost world of digital products 
and markets, e-commerce II (Laudon 2002) business models cannot use the traditional 
model based on incremental growth. Reverse engineering and replication of digital 
products and processes makes up for the eroding windows of opportunity. Due to zero 
variable cost, prices depress quickly between competitors to unsustainable levels in the 
medium and long run. Th is requires that ﬁ rms quickly dominate the market by acquir-
ing and securing large traﬃ  c and transaction volumes. Th e size and convoluted struc-
ture of the Internet makes this increasingly costlier and results in extended periods 
of up-front ﬁ xed cost. A competitive model would make recouping this accumulated 
negative cash ﬂ ow unpredictable. Th is, in turn would eliminate incentives for capital 
investment and innovation. Only if a ﬁ rm can almost immediately build critical mass 
and capture substantial market share will it be in the position to predictably recoup 
the initial investment.
It seems that the legal system in its current articulation cannot adequately cap-
ture this atypical requirement. It continues to cater to an atomistic market with mo-
nopolistic competition characteristics. But the successful examples of the new quasi-
monopolies of e-Bay, Amazon, Microsoft , and AOL, contrasted with the failures of 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Williams Companies (in the absence of monopoly 
power), to name but a few, seem to suggest that we should expect ﬁ rms to actively pres-
sure the system to include a model analogous to the regulation of natural monopolies, 
be it based on the notion of return on capital investment, price ceilings, or other. In the 
absence of such regulatory intervention these forms will just substitute their monopoly 
power to regulatory authority and thus “capture” the regulator in an extreme way.
Secondly, information is a dramatically appreciating asset. Organizations are 
now faced with the following quandary: originally, the value of information increased 
through sharing. But this was more true for intra-ﬁ rm information. Inter-ﬁ rm infor-
mation, in contrast, has two components: One that allows for the value creating eﬀ ects 
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of integration and networking economics through openness, the other that provides 
competitive advantage. Th is competitive advantage derives, however, less from resource 
speciﬁ city or internal capability, and more from proposing a particular business proc-
ess on a ﬁ rst mover basis.  It thus needs to be immediately secured and controlled. In 
parallel to the pharmaceutical industry, patents are used to secure intellectual property 
rights and allow for a limited time of monopolistic exploitation of those rights. But the 
property rights were originally conceived for tangible products. Th eir recent exten-
sion to business process and models with the State Street Bank decision in 1998 (State 
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, Fed. Cir. 1998), 
provided unprecedented momentum for monopoly structures. Th is in turn is gravely 
inconsistent with the objectives of antitrust regulation. It furthermore makes increas-
ingly diﬃ  cult to determine if, how, and to what extent originally public knowledge is 
being isolated, converted to a private good, and appropriated. We expect ﬁ rms to want 
to continue with their patenting practices at high velocity to obtain the situation of 
eﬀ ective “regulatory arbitrage”.
Lastly, the above mentioned portion of knowledge that remains shared is done 
so only with the intention to destroy any remnants of strategic advantage of the com-
petition. Th is is achieved by imposing proprietary technology as de facto standards. 
Th e value is greatest for the ﬁ rst-mover ﬁ rm that is able to propagate its originally 
private technology throughout the industry to become widely adopted as an industry 
standard. Even if subsequent adopters derive value from some form of facilitated ac-
cess to existing networks, their innovative capacity and activity is predicated. Th is type 
of “regulatory opportunism seems in contradiction with the regulatory perspective of 
network and technology neutrality that evolved over the last two decades.   
Coping with this new context, CITI ﬁ rms assume a more ambivalent and con-
troversial posture that merits a more careful assessment of their aforementioned, pre-
sumably benevolent and noble contributions. Th ey may not be entirely socially beneﬁ -
cial, aft er all. Th ey may indeed cause social costs, however diﬃ  cult to identify, capture, 
measure, and quantify. We propose a topology of behaviors ranging from hostile, to ag-
gressive, to virulent and analyze the responses of these ﬁ rms based on their intensity.
 (a) At the most intense level, there is evidence of a right out hostile attitude 
in the form of extreme regulatory capture:  Distortions to the originally 
benign imperfect market construct of monopolistic competition have un-
duly concentrated innovative eﬀ orts in the hands of a few, overwhelming 
and neutralizing regulation in favor of reduced competitiveness and mo-
nopolistic dominance; the resulting cost lies in the social value that was 
prevented from being created. 
(b) Less intense, but aggressive is the approach of regulatory arbitrage. Assault 
on established institutional legal standards through either aggressive expan-
sion of the law (such as the intellectual property protection mechanisms to 
patent business methods, preventing many transactions in e-commerce) or 
sheer sidestepping of the law (such as in contractual disputes, ignoring the 
rule of due process).
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(c) Finally, it its least intense form, the posture of ﬁ rms is that of regulatory 
opportunism, i.e. the deliberate and intentional and preemptive occupation 
via the creation of de facto regulation and near-binding proprietary stand-
ards of yet unregulated space as a result of express regulatory forbearance.
We take up the discussion of each of these categories in turn to demonstrate 
their sub-optimizing and unconstructive character insomuch as they represent a veri-
table assault on our existing regulatory institutions.
3.1 Th e new nature of regulatory capture
Th e traditional understanding of regulatory capture places the regulator under 
the dominant inﬂ uence of the socio-economic actor it was originally intended to regu-
late (Stigler 1971). 
Th e issues of information technology are so intensely complex and technically 
complicated that any attempt at bureaucratic regulation is overwhelmed. Th e legal in-
frastructure of the fading industrial economic model is increasingly incapable of cap-
turing and resolving the novel issues of the digital economy, so much so that the ﬁ rm 
actors do not contend themselves with simply inﬂ uencing the regulator, but indeed 
substitute themselves into this position. 
Even if regulation historically lagged perpetually with respect to technological 
progress, it still seemed adequately resilient and responsive to aﬀ ord industrial trans-
formation and transaction-oriented technologies with stability, linearity, and continu-
ity (Drucker 1993).  Th is presumed capability and purpose of the regulatory environ-
ment is, however, entirely in question with respect to a digital and network economy.  
Th e original motivation for a regulatory environment evolved from a neo-
Smithian perspective of imperfect markets: with the increasing integration of social, 
organizational, and political structures the, original assumption of markets, in prin-
ciple, as natural and spontaneous social orders, trading only rivalrous and excludable 
goods, became untenable. Th e discovery of the socially undesirable behaviors of un-
derproduction and overconsumption of public goods along with the access and equita-
bility problems of use of impure public goods, as well as the non-regenerable depletion 
of commonpool resources, led to the recognition that markets are social construc-
tions which, in order to function properly, need rules and governance in the ﬁ rst place. 
Without them, transacting in markets with information asymmetries, moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems, externalities, bounded rationality, opportunism, and 
asset speciﬁ city have become too costly (Williamson 1975, 1985, cited in van Warden 
2001).
But the scope of the law was merely emulating the focus of strategy of the time. 
In the tradition of Adam Smith, Henry Watt, and Henry Ford, strategy was introverted, 
production-dominated, and concerned with transformation at operational level and 
integration at organizational level. Manufacturing and marketing products “cheaper, 
faster, better” was paramount. Th is transaction cost-sensitive environment relied heav-
ily on solutions to structured problems. One important purpose and realm of the law 
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was to establish such structure-providing mechanisms by reducing risks, uncertainty, 
turbulence, and chaos - and thus transaction costs, and by creating a regulated, reliable, 
and safe environment for transactions at the lowest possible cost (Coase 1937).   
Some of the heritage of the ‘invisible hand’, however, was preserved: modern 
implementations of regulated markets are compromises between the two extremes, 
striking a balance between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’. Th e American model, spe-
ciﬁ cally, realized its maximum-incentives-through-minimum-intervention objectives 
with a composite approach between a minimalist legal structure properly speaking, 
and a positivist-aﬃ  rmative ethical superimposition, commonly referred to as social 
corporate responsibility. Th is resulted in a rather fragmented, sometimes uncohesive, 
and somewhat uncoordinated body of exception-based rules respective of most of 
what is economically plausible, and limited to correcting the blatantly socially undesir-
able activities and outcomes.
Th e transition to a post-industrial – or sometimes labeled ‘post-capitalist’ 
(Drucker 1993) economic model - and the passage from an organization-centric in-
formation-asymmetric to a network-based economy with its new symmetries and a 
pronounced demand-side character is rapidly liquefying previous paradigms, includ-
ing the law. Based on services and knowledge-products, the extroverted experience 
economy of digital markets, digital and digitizeable goods, and intensely networked 
and connected participants, is not merely characterized by a diﬀ erence in degree of in-
tensity or pace of change.  It is diﬀ erent in nature and by orders of magnitude. It is not 
merely variable, but volatile, not merely unstable, but discontinuous. It is quickly dis-
aggregating so carefully craft ed aggregated structures, quickly dismantling the realm 
of previous forms of intermediation, and re-intermediating, and re-aggregating ever 
faster and truly thriving on Schumpeterian “creative destruction”.   
Th e regulatory and legal environments have not kept up with this revolutionary 
transition, however. Regulation and the law itself has become a source of uncertainty 
and risk, thus amplifying the already risky and uncertainty-fraught information tech-
nology innovation process. Th e legal and ethical guidelines have lost their directive 
and governance authority in an environment of global monopolies, questionable copy-
right motives, and proprietary standards.
Th e legal community has been addressing this problem virulently with a posi-
tivist perspective. On the one hand, the extent of the current legal environment’s ca-
pacity to adapt (in the areas of antitrust, copyright, and patent law), and on the other, 
the exposures arising from the existing and active body of law are being examined, 
especially in the context of e-commerce, the Internet, and the open source movement. 
Attempts are being opposed to enrich the inherently private and contractual nature of 
business law with public extensions, such as criminal law (Freedman 1999), or uncon-
ventional ones, such as custom (Polanski, Johnston 2002). Th ese tendencies have begun 
spilling over into the information technology and systems discipline that has begun to 
investigate the problem more tentatively, tangentially, and peripherally (van Waarden 
2001; Martin 2002). To date we found little research directly and systematically ad-
dressing these issues. 
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We argue that the issues are not completely elucidated with the current perspec-
tive of legal parochialism. Th e law itself is being greatly impacted by the revolution-
ary advances in information technology. Th e question arises if and to what extent the 
information technology community not only aﬀ ects but substitutes itself for the law 
and the regulator.     
Enter the CITI ﬁ rm. To the uninitiated observer, the persistent trend of such 
ﬁ rms to emerge as monopolies over relatively short periods of time (e.g. Google took 
seven years to accomplish what WalMart hadn’t been able in over forty years) may 
seem like just a clever use of the dimensions of monopolistic competition. Taking 
advantage of positive feedback eﬀ ects of network economies, costless re-production 
and endless distribution of digitized and digitizeable information products, and the 
concept of zero variable cost seem to have almost naturally resulted in the need for a 
single producer in its category, in the most violent sense yet of “category killer”.
Yet, the concept of monopolistic competition was not intended to provide a 
monopoly position. It was intended to aﬀ ord uncontested proﬁ ts as long as they re-
sulted from clever marketing of one’s own brand, for example. 
But manipulating monopolistic competition to yield a monopoly position, be-
yond immediate private advantages, has an even more profound feedback eﬀ ect on 
the institutional make-up of our regulatory framework. Th e CITI ﬁ rms are not only 
capable of emulating traditional ﬁ rm structures, or morph into markets or any hybrid 
form in between. Th eir technological scale and scope now enables them to take on – at 
will - the nature of regulators in their own right. AOL regulates content. Google regu-
lates applications. Amazon is a market-maker. Facebook captures and exposes our lives. 
MySpace controls our creative expression. eBay creates movements of goods outside of 
the reach of taxation authority. 80% of personal ads on Craig’s list are solicitations for 
illegal prostitution…
3.2 Th e opportunities for regulatory arbitrage
By arbitrage, we allude to the potential to exploit as yet unrealized opportunities 
resulting from information-technological asymmetry. 
One such example is the accelerated enforcement of contractual obligations and 
the punitive character of contractual terminations with so called shrinkwrap or click-
wrap contracts in the interest of expedience and eﬃ  ciency. Th e age old rule of due 
process requiring court-based proceedings for breach of contract is rendered ineﬀ ective 
and ﬁ rms self-manage contractual issues. 
Another example is the restrictions on fair use by digital rights management 
practices lobbied into law through the Digital Copyright Millenium Act (signed into 
law by President Bill Clinton on October 28, 1998).    
Finally the most telling example is ironically also the most ambivalent, and near 
inconclusive:
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Important impact was exerted by CITI ﬁ rms through a less noticed market-
institutional by-product, the regulatory framework for intellectual property rights. In 
an initial wave, it was a defying P2P movement symbolized by Napster that tried to 
neutralize copyright. 
In a contradictory movement the extension of patent law provided for even 
more controversy. While it seemed a benign idea initially, the framework’s extension 
to include business method patents in the 1998 State Street Bank v. Signature Financial 
group decision (ibid.) was nothing short of a true quantum leap in terms of legitimiz-
ing monopoly and chilling competitiveness. Th e lobbying for this integrative approach 
to patents paid oﬀ  handsomely: Amazon leaped ahead with a series of controversial 
patents such as the One-Click-Stop-Shop, Google patented its method of assessing rel-
evancy, and eBay snapped up the repackaging of trust with its seller rating application. 
In fact the U.S. PTO saw rapid rise in patent applications from 1998 to 1999 and had 
to change the durational terms of patents from 17 years (as of grant) to 20 years (as of 
ﬁ ling) (see Alter 1999).
While the recent Bilski decision (in re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 
Fed. Cir. 2008) may have eﬀ ectively put an end to the period of protective excess for 
intellectual property rights, it remains that the originally unthoughtful complacency 
and convenience of the regulator may have already caused irreversible damage. For 
many information technology-industrial categories monopolies are in place and are 
exerting control over ideas, resources, and commercialization. While large amounts of 
value were generated, much value creation may also have been, currently is being, and 
will continue to be prevented.
Th e described situation seems rather antithetical to the spirit of information 
and information technology. While intellectual property rights were intended to allow 
information creators to secure beneﬁ ts from their innovation creation they were not 
intended to allow for a comprehensive position of monopoly. Granting such a posi-
tion was bestowed on the legislator. Yet the framework for IP is admittedly antiquated 
and rather inadequately adapted from an industrial world where scarce resources ne-
cessitated allocational eﬃ  ciency and economies of scale. By judicious, selective, and 
discretionary manipulation of a framework that has long overwhelmed its regulators, 
these ﬁ rms are taking the law in their own hands by creating de facto situations oft en 
stronger than authoritative law or legitimate governance: In the name of freedom of 
the Internet these organizations are increasingly restricting the functioning of industry 
participants and preventing new entrants by creating monopolies and forging ever-
faster consolidation. Th ey are outmaneuvering legitimate legal governance through 
regulatory arbitrage waging standard wars and sidestepping due process.
Th ese actions in fact rival the very position of the legislator in this respect. Th ey 
have assumed the position of the legislator through clever combinations and syner-
gies among several intellectual property rights patents, combining them to an eﬀ ective 
weapon against other industry participants, securing their own position and not lim-
ited to securing the proﬁ ts and beneﬁ ts from their creations. Such behavior, primarily 
anti-competitive and only secondarily proﬁ t-motivated had already previously been 
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an issue in Microsoft  securing its own position beyond what had been solely possible 
through marketing.
Th is last example also demonstrates the ingenuity of the CITI ﬁ rm to increase 
eﬀ ectiveness of their quasi-regulatory ambitions through a layered approach, synergis-
tically leveraging a composite of all three regulatory approaches.
3.3  Th e potential for regulatory opportunism
In its least intense expression, albeit virulent, the stance vis-à-vis regulatory sys-
tems takes the form of regulatory opportunism. With regulatory opportunism we are 
addressing the proclivity of CITI ﬁ rms that ﬁ ll the regulatory vacuum resulting from 
intentional and explicit regulatory forbearance. Analogous to the construct of techno-
logical opportunism (Srinivasan et al. 2002), we propose that - in a more benign and 
docile posture - these CITI ﬁ rms hone their law-sensing and law-response capabilities 
in the light of changes and turbulence in their legal environment. Th ey are likely to 
create pressures to make the legal environment gravitate towards them. We suggest 
that regulatory opportunism prompts those ﬁ rms to perceive the regulatory vacuum as 
legally turbulent and therefore as a potential source of growth for the ﬁ rms responding 
aﬃ  rmatively to absorb the ineﬃ  cacies of absent regulation.  
At the center of the controversy is the question for the need of specialized Cy-
berlaw, and its existence as a distinct body of “law pertaining to the Internet”. Th e mere 
existence of such a debate points to a turbulent legal environment result of inconsistent 
and inconsequential regulatory forbearance and positioning. Two views seem to be 
emerging on how e-commerce and traditional commerce are converging into a pow-
erful and dominating new form of brick-and-click commerce for the future: the tra-
ditional lawyers’ perspective is a moderate and evolutionary one, in which traditional 
ﬁ elds of law will incrementally absorb the issues posed by cyberspace.  Proponents of 
Cyberlaw, also labeled “cyber-revolutionaries”, however, promote regulatory forbear-
ance from the existing law in favor of an entirely and fundamentally new legal ﬁ eld, or 
even discipline, designed to speciﬁ cally address the threats posed by computer code. 
In their eyes, computer code is more powerful than legal code and poses particularly 
grave threats to online civil liberties and other acquired central values of American 
society left  without explicit legal protection by the framers of the Constitution (Lessig, 
1999, 2001).   What seems a rather explosive engagement of scholars has been prompt-
ed by the advent of the Internet especially with its commercial, global, and ubiquitous 
character. Th us circumscribed, it is now cyberspace that is impacting the law consider-
ably and in various areas. But unexpectedly, it invited CITI ﬁ rms to quickly want to 
back-ﬁ ll the vacuum in order to stabilize the environment.
Finally, a reference to the European eﬀ orts in the area may yield additional in-
sights. Contrary to the rather uncoordinated and fragmented eﬀ orts of cyberspace and 
e-commerce regulation in the U.S., Th e European Union has been attempting to gov-
ern with much more regulatory activism. Several recent directives try to frame aspects 
of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, legal aspects of e-commerce 
activities in the common market, harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and 
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related issues, and establish a common ground for the recognition of electronic signa-
tures (Rekola, Pohjanpalo 2002). One can certainly remain skeptical about the eﬀ ec-
tiveness and necessary dynamism of such eﬀ orts in the light of traditional legal inertia 
and the heterogeneity of views of twenty seven nations.  It remains to be seen to what 
extent a necessary compromise will be leading to a truly comprehensive, progressive, 
and pragmatic regulation. However, it is a prime example of a high level of cognizance 
of the issues on the part of the oﬃ  cial regulators and the desire to curtail too much 
corporate mercantilism to the detriment of consumer power.
4. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Th e present was a theoretical paper, outlining the contours of what we labeled 
the “dark side” of CITI ﬁ rms. Th e allegations of regulatory capture, regulatory arbitrage 
and regulatory opportunism are inherently unobservable and don’t lend themselves 
easily to empirical investigation. Th ey could, however, be captured via proxy metrics, 
such as the number of patents, revelatory public statements cited in the press as part of 
the ﬁ rms’ disclosure requirements or for-immediate-release announcements of materi-
al information, various capital formation and accumulation procedures, etc. Next steps 
would be to collect and evaluate such evidence. And in a further step yet, via aban-
doned projects or ﬁ rm failures in the industry, by assessing for example the number of 
ﬁ rms or innovations that never reach their tipping point, one may be able to quantify 
social costs and potential losses of social value.      
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NEGATIVNA STRANA PODUZEĆA KOJA INTENZIVNO 
KORISTE SLOŽENE INFORMACIJSKE TEHNOLOGIJE4
Jonatan Jelen 5 & Marko Kolaković 6
Sažetak
Iako su poduzeća nove ekonomije koja intenzivno koriste složene informacijske 
tehnologije (Complex Information Technology-Intensive ﬁ rms, CITI ﬁ rms) doprinijela 
razvoju konteksta i kreacije društvenih vrijednosti na dosad besprimjeran način, svejedno 
imaju i svoju negativnu stranu. Značajan dio njihovog dobronamjernog imidža i pohvalne 
reputacije leži na izrazito speciﬁ čnoj okosnici vlastitog interesa, vlastite zaštite i vlastite 
samoodrživosti, a to su: regulatorno zauzeće (regulatory capture), regulativna arbitraža 
(regulatory arbitrage) i regulatorni oportunizam (regulatory opportunism). U ovom radu 
naglasak će biti stavljen na razotkrivanju te ujedno i pomirenju međusobno konﬂ iktnih 
obilježja CITI poduzeća, iz razloga što se njihov prividan imperativ stvaranja društvene 
vrijednosti zasniva na kontroverznim kvazi-regulatornim aktivnostima.
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